We examine the interplay between two important policies that impact the environmental performance in a production setting: inspections performed by a regulator and noncompliance disclosure by a manufacturing …rm. Expecting that a penalty will be levied once an inspection discovers noncompliance, the …rm decides whether it should disclose a random occurrence of noncompliance.
Introduction
Enforcement of environmental regulations is fraught with challenges. Not only do the regulatory bodies such as the Environmental Protection Agency operate under budget and resource constraints that limit their ability to reign on potential violators, they also face a nontrivial problem that renders enforcement particularly di¢ cult: information acquisition. Unlike in many settings where a …rm's private knowledge or action is re ‡ected in performance outcomes that can be directly observed (for example, a user of equipment can estimate its reliability after experiencing downtimes during its operation), without direct consumers of environmental outputs, the indicators of a …rm's regulation compliance are not readily available. Indeed, many environmental violations-especially those committed by small …rms-go unreported because their individual output is not large and visible enough to trigger an alarm.
Collectively, however, the sum of individual contributions may cause serious and potentially permanent damages to the environment (Kolstad 2011 ).
Under such a circumstance, the regulator who wishes to obtain information about a …rm's compliance status would have no realistic choice other than to inspect the …rm on site. Inspections are costly, especially because most violations occur sporadically in dispersed locations. These logistical di¢ culties are compounded by the fact that inspections are imperfect, in many cases due to the random nature of violations that occur despite the …rms'best intentions. Such instances include: accidental release of untreated wastewater, excessive carbon emissions due to control system malfunctions, and toxic chemical spills following natural disasters. As Beavis and Walker (1983) put it, "Dischargers [of pollutants] are frequently unable to control with any great degree of accuracy the quantity and quality of wastes associated with speci…c levels of their productive activities." According to Malik (1993) , "Pollution emissions by …rms commonly depend on stochastic events such as equipment malfunctions, variations in input quality, and process upsets."In the presence of these uncertainties, an enforcement authority faces a challenge in devising cost-e¤ective inspection strategies.
The tradeo¤ between cost of inspections and the social bene…t of environmental preservation has been explored in the academic literature, starting from a broader context of law enforcements. One of the most well-known economic insights coming from this literature is that inspection intensity and the degree of sanction act as substitutes. That is, the regulator can save the cost of inspections without a¤ecting a potential violator's behavior if the latter is threatened with a large penalty; the larger the penalty, the lower the intensity of inspections needed. 1 This intuitive notion of substitutability is regarded as fundamental, as evidenced by the following quote from an environmental economics textbook: "Increased monitoring activity by enforcement o¢ cials will have an e¤ect similar to increased punishment levels... In theory, higher penalties can always substitute for lowered enforcement e¤orts" (Goodstein 2011, p. 286) .
In this paper we reexamine this claim from a new perspective. In doing so, we develop a novel analytical framework that operationalizes the optimal enforcement decisions in the presence of stochastically evolving compliance states, inspired by the "inspection models" found in the theory of reliability. These model features are naturally built in a production setting where a manufacturing …rm undergoes occasional environmental violations and restores compliance after each occurrence. We enrich this framework by adding an element of incentives: the …rm's voluntary disclosure of noncompliance. That is, the …rm makes a self-interested decision to either keep silence about an unintentional violation or disclose it to "come clean." Anticipating such a behavior, the regulator employs one of the two inspection policies: periodic inspections and random inspections. Under periodic inspections the regulator performs inspections according to a set schedule of constant intervals, whereas under random inspections the regulator randomizes the inspection intervals by sampling from a probability distribution. This new model framework allows us to address the following research questions that have been overlooked in the literature. Given that environmental violations occur randomly over time and that the …rm may disclose noncompliance selectively, should the regulator perform periodic inspections or random inspections? How does the …rm's opportunistic disclosure behavior impact the relationship between the two enforcement levers, inspection intensity and penalty?
We …nd that, contrary to the common belief found in the literature, inspection intensity and penalty are not necessarily substitutes; there are situations where the two act as complements. That is, the regulator may have to complement penalty with frequent inspections-stick and more stick instead of carrot and stick-in order to induce the desired behavior of the …rm and minimize the social cost and environmental damage. We also …nd that, surprisingly, the regulator may …nd periodic inspections more cost-e¤ective than random inspections. This is in spite of the fact that periodic inspections provide the …rm with perfect knowledge about the inspection schedule whereas random inspections do not; even though better information may encourage the …rm to act more opportunistically, such an adverse e¤ect does not necessarily lead to a net loss in e¢ ciency. We identify the conditions under which one inspection policy is preferred to the other, and o¤er managerial insights and policy recommendations.
Related Literature
Our model integrates the elements from two distinct streams of literature which, to the best of our knowledge, have never been put together in a single problem setting. They are: theory of reliability and economics of law enforcement. As we demonstrate, the ideas from each of these areas-developed in isolation over the years-bring new perspectives to the topic of environmental regulation once they are combined. Among the vast number of articles that have been published in these areas of research, in this section we survey the most relevant ones that inspired the model presented in this paper.
Theory of Reliability
Reliability theory concerns itself with evaluating performances of technological systems subject to random failures. See Barlow and Proschan (1996) and Rausand and Høyland (2004) for overviews of the foundations and applications of reliability theory. Among many models that have been proposed in the literature, the ones that have direct relevance to our problem are the models of inspection policies (Barlow and Proschan 1996, pp. 107-118 ). These models assume that the state of a system (i.e., whether the system is functioning or not) is normally invisible to a system operator. As a result, a system failure is not reported unless it is discovered by an inspection. An operator who wishes to detect a failure early faces a cost-bene…t tradeo¤ because the chance of detection increases with the frequency of inspections but inspections are costly to perform. The models suggest optimal inspection schedules and strategies designed to balance this tradeo¤, based on probabilistic representations of random failure processes.
A variant of the inspection models particularly relevant to our problem is the "intermittent faults" model, in which a system restores itself after each instance of repeated failures (Su et al. 1978 , pp. 220-224). Thus the system alternates between "on"and "o¤"states stochastically over time without the intervention of an operator. Due to the random process, detection of a failure is not guaranteed. The operator's goal is to maximize the probability of detection by planning a frequent but cost-e¤ective inspection schedule.
The inspection models-the model of intermittent faults in particular-provide the mathematical foundations that are well-suited for analyzing the problem of environmental regulation enforcements.
First, a parallel can be made between random system failures and stochastic pollutions, since many environmental violations occur unexpectedly despite the …rms'best intentions (e.g., when a pollution control system malfunctions). Second, in most cases inspections are needed to discover environmental violations, which are often hidden from the public's view. Third, the repeated nature of environmental violations and audits is captured in the inspection models, which evaluate long-term strategies for managing recurring failures. What lacks in the inspection models is the dimension of incentives, which we discuss next.
Economics of Law Enforcement
The basic premise of the inspection models, namely that constant monitoring is prohibitive because inspections are costly, was recognized in the economics literature by . In his model of probabilistic law enforcement, an enforcement authority combines random audits with sanctions (e.g., …nes or imprisonment) in order to maximize the probability of apprehending the violators. A sanction in ‡uences the potential violator's behavior, an element missing in the inspection models. Becker's seminal work has been extended in many directions, notably by who incorporate voluntary disclosure. They consider individuals who have committed a socially harmful act but have an option to self-report it to the authorities. This feature is especially relevant to our model, as we incorporate self-disclosure of noncompliance .
The ideas introduced in these papers have been reinterpreted in the context of environmental regulations; see Cohen (1999) for a survey. Of particular relevance to this paper are the articles that consider enforcements in the presence of stochastic emissions, including Beavis and Walker (1982) , Malik (1993) , and Innes (1999) . The messages are largely consistent with those from and others in the law enforcement literature, although idiosyncrasies exist. Russell (1990) is one of the few papers that feature a Markov process in an environmental audit context, but the focus is on random errors in audits instead of random occurrences of noncompliance. In a recent article, To¤el and Short (2011) establish hypotheses based on the theoretical predictions from these works as they empirically test whether the …rms that self-report violations also self-police their operations to reduce emissions.
Despite some commonalities shared with these works, this paper distinguishes itself in a number of important aspects. First, we focus on environmental violations that occur unintentionally, driven by a random process. These types of violations are common in practice but they have received relatively little attention in the literature. Second, the way we model uncertainty is more realistic than those of Malik (1993) , Innes (1999) , and others. Unlike the stylized representations of random emissions found in these works, our model features a Markov chain of compliance/noncompliance states that alternate over time. Third, in contrast to and others who represent a random audit simply as a single probability measure, we bring precision to the mechanics of audits by modeling repeated inspections that may or may not detect noncompliance. Finally, the …rm in our model decides not only whether noncompliance should be disclosed but also when it should be disclosed. This timing aspect has been ignored in the literature, and our model brings new perspectives by explicitly taking it into account.
Sustainable Operations
In recent years various issues of sustainability have drawn interests among the researchers in opera- Although not framed as sustainability issues, Kim et al. (2010) and Kim and Tomlin (2012) share similarities with this paper in the modeling approaches based on reliability theory and the common theme of managing low-probability, high-consequence events.
More closely related to this paper are a number of recent articles that discuss audits and information disclosure in environmental regulations. Kalkanci et al. (2012) study the environmental impacts of voluntary and mandatory disclosure rules applied to supply chains. Jira and To¤el (2012) identify the conditions under which supply chain parties share information about greenhouse gas emissions.
Plambeck and Taylor (2010) is one of the few articles in the OM literature that import ideas from the law enforcement economics literature, but they focus on issues that exist in a competitive market.
Plambeck and Taylor (2012) study the dynamics that arise when …rms make e¤orts to evade auditing, the topic we do not address in this paper. However, our …ndings on voluntary disclosure complement those in Plambeck and Taylor (2012) . In sum, this paper is uniquely positioned in terms of research focus, insights, and the model features that bridge the gap between distinct areas of research.
Model

Overview
A …rm ("he") produces a good and sells it to consumers. Production requires use of an environmentally harmful substance ("pollutant"), which may be emitted to the environment. A regulator ("she") is responsible for enforcing the environmental regulation. Both parties are risk neutral. Production and sales start at time zero and last over an in…nite horizon. Production runs continuously unless it is temporarily suspended (more on this later). For the duration in which production is suspended, the …rm loses a sales opportunity.
At any given moment the …rm is in one of two states: the …rm is said to be in compliance if pollutant emission is blocked, whereas it is in noncompliance if the pollutant is being emitted. These two states last for random amounts of time, and they alternate stochastically over time at constant transition rates. 2 The …rm has complete visibility to the state but the regulator does not. There are two ways in which noncompliance is reported to the regulator: either the regulator discovers noncompliance after she performs an inspection (detection) or the …rm preemptively informs it (disclosure). Note that we do not consider the …rm's willful violations to save costs or attempts to evade inspections, the subjects beyond the scope of this paper. We assume that an inspection reveals the state immediately and that noncompliance is costlessly veri…ed once it is disclosed. 3 Once noncompliance is reported, the regulator learns its start and end times (which together de…ne the boundaries of the reported noncompliance episode) as she receives details of a violation while being kept informed of the progress made in restoring compliance. If the …rm does not disclose a noncompliance episode, it may or may not be detected by the regulator because the episode lasts for a random amount of time; detection occurs if an inspection arrives before the episode concludes, whereas detection does not occur if the episode falls completely within the interval between two successive inspections. See Figure 1 for illustrations.
Production and inspections are suspended immediately after noncompliance is reported and remain suspended until compliance is restored. (If this assumption is violated, suboptimal outcomes arise in which unnecessary inspections are performed and avoidable emissions accumulate.) Both activities resume upon compliance restoration. Because a noncompliance episode may be reported after some time has passed since it started, as is the case when it is reported via detection, an episode may consist of two successive portions: unsuspended noncompliance and suspended noncompliance. Pollutant is emitted in the …rst portion but not in the second portion, during which there is no production output.
The regulator utilizes two enforcement levers: inspections and penalty. The latter is imposed upon discovery of noncompliance. Before time zero the regulator sets the inspection frequency and Compliance and noncompliance states alternate over time, while the regulator performs an inspection every T time units unless it is suspended due to a noncompliance report via detection or disclosure. The inspection process restarts upon compliance restoration. The independent and identically distributed durations of compliance and noncompliance episodes are denoted by U and D, respectively.
the penalty amount, subsequently announcing them to the …rm. The regulator does not update these decisions once they are announced. In response, the …rm devises a decision rule which speci…es how much information should be disclosed preemptively. Thus, we seek a subgame perfect equilibrium of this two-stage game in which the regulator moves …rst as the Stackelberg leader. The inspection and disclosure policies employed by the regulator and the …rm are detailed in §3.4. The regulator makes decisions to maximize the long-run average social welfare, whereas the …rm makes decisions to maximize his long-run average pro…t.
Compliance State Transitions
If the …rm is in compliance during production or if production is suspended following a report of noncompliance, no pollutant is emitted to the environment. (While zero emission is a simplifying assumption, relaxing it does not signi…cantly impact the results.) On the other hand, if the …rm is in noncompliance but production continues ("noncompliant production"), the pollutant is emitted at a constant rate.
The compliance and noncompliance states alternate as a two-state continuous-time Markov chain with the rates and , respectively. Hence, the …rm stays in the compliance state for an exponentially distributed amount of time with mean 1= and in the noncompliance state for an exponentially distributed amount of time with mean 1= . The rate is interpreted as the capacity to restore compliance which the …rm has installed before production starts. We assume that , i.e., noncompliance is a rare occurrence. Initially at time zero, the …rm is in compliance. The probability that the …rm starts in the compliance state at time zero and ends in the noncompliance state at time t is (Nakagawa 2005, p. 221)
We assume that the transition rates and are exogenously given and una¤ected by managerial interventions.
Production and Economics
In order to highlight the dynamics arising from stochastic compliance state transitions and the inspection/disclosure policies that depend on them, in our model we keep the representation of the production process to a minimum. It is assumed that the demands for the …rm's good are deterministic and that they arrive at a constant rate, normalized to one. Each unit of demand triggers a production order (i.e., make-to-order production). Hence, production runs at a constant rate equal to one unless it is suspended due to a report of noncompliance. Production and delivery lead times are negligible and there is no …xed setup cost. We assume that all unmet demands due to suspended production are lost and that no inventory is held by the …rm.
The …rm earns revenue r for each unit sold. To focus on the relationship between the …rm and the regulator, we do not explicitly model the consumer purchasing behavior and assume that they make zero surplus for the units they acquire. Production cost is normalized to zero. If the …rm continues production while not being in compliance, pollutant is emitted at a constant rate and causes environmental damage valued at h per unit time. Damage is avoided if production is suspended following a report of noncompliance. The value h re ‡ects both immediate and long-term impacts on the environment, and we assume that it is higher than the opportunity cost of lost sales, i.e., h > r.
This assumption implies that, from the society's standpoint, pollution prevention takes precedence over revenue generation.
The regulator incurs a …xed cost each time she performs an inspection. We assume that the cost of performing an inspection is su¢ ciently small so that the condition < (h r) = 2 is satis…ed. 4 This condition ensures that the regulator has an incentive to perform inspections; if it is violated, the …rm may …nd inspections too costly to justify the potential social bene…t. The …rm is liable to the penalty , which is levied by the regulator if it is discovered that the damage to the environment has already been done. Therefore, the …rm pays the penalty if the regulator's inspection detects noncompliance or if the …rm is found to have been in noncompliance at the time of his disclosure. By contrast, the …rm is exempt from the penalty if he discloses noncompliance as soon as it occurs, because the immediate suspension of production followed by such an action leaves no environmental damage.
We assume that there is an upper bound on whose value is exogenously given. This rules out an unrealistic scenario where the regulator imposes an arbitrarily large penalty on the …rm. A similar assumption is commonly found in the literature (e.g., Shavell 1994, Innes 1999 ) and is often justi…ed on the grounds that …nancial and legal restrictions such as the bankruptcy risk limit the penalty size. For notational convenience we specify the upper bound as r , where is the normalized maximum penalty. 5 Henceforth the condition r is referred to as maximum penalty constraint.
In addition, we make the following mild technical assumption to further rule out unlikely situations:
< b y= where b y > 0 is the unique solution to the equation 
Inspection and Disclosure Policies
We assume that the regulator employs one of two inspection policies: periodic inspections and random inspections. In both cases the regulator performs inspections every T time units-a variable we call We assume that T under the random inspection policy is exponentially distributed. This assumption is made in order to maximize the contrast between random and periodic inspections. Because of memorylessness, the …rm facing random inspections with exponential intervals has identical outlook of the future at each point in time; the "surprise factor"of random inspections is maximal under this policy, since the timing of the past inspection is irrelevant in predicting when the next inspection will take place. This is in sharp contrast to the case of periodic inspections, since under this policy the past inspection informs the …rm with perfect knowledge about the timing of the next inspection; in this case, the surprise factor is zero.
The …rm is said to practice nondisclosure if he never discloses noncompliance. Similarly, full disclosure means that the …rm discloses all occurrences of noncompliance, while partial disclosure means only selected ones are disclosed. The values of enforcement and economic parameters determine which practice is adopted by the …rm. The simplest choice is between full disclosure and nondisclosure:
either disclose all or nothing. Such a binary decision makes sense in some situations, but in general admitting partial disclosure improves the …rm's performance.
If the …rm were to adopt partial disclosure, an important factor in deciding whether to disclose a particular occurrence of noncompliance is when it occurs. This is because there is a high chance that the …rm will escape detection if the next inspection is to arrive far into the future. In such a case he is willing to take a chance and not disclose noncompliance, since it is likely that compliance will be restored before the next inspection. By contrast, such willingness is lower if noncompliance occurs shortly before the next inspection; in this case the …rm may be better o¤ disclosing it preemptively to avoid being detected and penalized. This reasoning suggests that the natural disclosure policy in the presence of such a "horizon e¤ect" is of the threshold kind. We formally state the two disclosure policies described so far.
De…nition 1 Under the binary disclosure policy, the …rm either discloses every occurrence of noncompliance at its onset or does not disclose any. Under the threshold disclosure policy, the …rm discloses an occurrence of noncompliance at its onset if and only if the time remaining until the expected arrival of the next inspection is smaller than or equal to s 2 [0; ].
We call the time interval of length s in the de…nition disclosure window. By de…nition this window never exceeds the expected inspection interval; hence it satis…es 0 s . Under the threshold disclosure policy the …rm discloses only the noncompliance episodes that start within the disclosure window, situated in the later portion of the inspection interval. Hence, the larger the window, the more noncompliance episodes disclosed. Note that the threshold disclosure policy includes nondisclosure and full disclosure as special cases, each corresponding to s = 0 and s = , respectively. We assume that the …rm employs either the binary or threshold disclosure policy, choosing between the two depending on whether he is subject to periodic or random inspections. (As we show later, the threshold disclosure policy does not always present an advantage over the binary disclosure policy.)
An important part of De…nition 1 is that the …rm is assumed to disclose noncompliance immediately after it occurs. This is intuitive because the …rm may avoid the penalty with certainty by not postponing disclosure. To streamline exposition we prescribe the immediate disclosure as part of the de…nitions of disclosure policies, noting that it is in fact optimal under both random and periodic inspections (proof is found in the accompanying Technical Appendix).
Decisions and Objectives
Before time zero, given the announced penalty 0 and the inspection frequency > 0 (or equivalently the mean inspection interval > 0), the …rm sets the disclosure policy by choosing between the threshold policy and the binary policy. Under the threshold policy, the …rm sets the disclosure window size s. Under the binary policy, the …rm chooses either nondisclosure or full disclosure. The …rm's objective is to maximize his long-run average pro…t. Anticipating this response, the regulator chooses the values of and that maximize the long-run average social welfare subject to the maximum penalty constraint r . 7 Let I, R, and B denote the long-run averages of the following performance measures, in the presented order: the number of inspections performed, the cumulative duration of suspended noncompliance, and the cumulative duration of unsuspended noncompliance. Under the assumptions outlined above, the long-run average social welfare is then equal to r(1 R) I hB: the …rm earns the revenue r per unit time unless production is suspended, which lasts R per unit time in the long-run; the regulator incurs the …xed cost each time she performs an inspection, doing so I times per unit time in the long-run; the damage valued at h is done to the environment while noncompliant production lasts B per unit time in the long-run. Note that the penalty does not appear in the social welfare function because it is the amount of a transfer between the …rm and the regulator that cancels out within the social boundaries.
From the expression above it is clear that maximizing the long-run average social welfare is equivalent to minimizing the long-run average social cost C I + rR + hB, the convention we adopt in the remainder of the paper. Similarly, the …rm's pro…t-maximization problem is formulated as the equivalent cost-minimization problem, denoting his long-run average cost. The expressions for C and are evaluated in the next section, where we characterize the equilibria under the periodic and random inspection policies.
Equilibria Under Periodic and Random Inspections
In this section we characterize the equilibria that emerge under the periodic and random inspection policies. In each case we evaluate the long-run average performance measures I, R, B, and that de…ne the objective functions, derive the …rm's optimal response to the regulator's announcement of the penalty amount and the inspection frequency, and solve the regulator's social cost minimization problem. The comparisons of equilibria are presented in §5.
Periodic Inspections
Recall that the inspection interval T under periodic inspections is deterministic and equal to the constant . Before characterizing the equilibrium, we …rst develop the expressions for performance measures when the …rm employs the threshold disclosure policy in response to periodic inspections.
Performance Measures Under Threshold Disclosure Policy
The . Note also that an inspection cycle may end at, before, or after time units since the start, because it takes a random amount of time for compliance to be restored after detection or disclosure. Thus the length of an inspection cycle-denoted by X-is random, and it is to be distinguished from the constant inspection interval T = .
Depending on whether the …rm is in compliance at the beginning of the disclosure window (at time s since the cycle start), under the threshold disclosure policy the three outcomes above are further divided into …ve cases, referred to as Case 1a, Case 1b, etc. See Figure 2 that illustrates these cases.
1. The …rm is in compliance at time s since the cycle start. Moreover: (a) compliance lasts until or after time , at which the current inspection cycle ends with an inspection (but no detection); (b) noncompliance starts before time and at that moment the …rm discloses the state, and subsequently the current inspection cycle ends when compliance is restored.
2. The …rm is in noncompliance at time s since the cycle start. Moreover: (a) noncompliance lasts until or after time , at which the regulator's inspection detects noncompliance and subsequently the current inspection cycle ends when compliance is restored; (b) compliance is restored before time and it lasts until or after time , at which the current inspection cycle ends with an inspection (but no detection); (c) compliance is restored before time but it is followed by a transition to noncompliance before time which is disclosed by the …rm, and subsequently the current inspection cycle ends when compliance is restored again.
Note that in all cases at most one new noncompliance episode occurs within the disclosure window because, under the threshold disclosure policy, the …rm always discloses the …rst of such occurrences (see Cases 1b and 2c in Figure 2 ) and subsequently the current inspection cycle ends as soon as compliance is restored. As a result, the …ve cases described above form a complete list of categories ; (iv) = r s + (r + )
These approximations simplify the expressions substantially, enabling tractability. We use them as the basis of our analysis in the remainder of the paper. Finally, the long-run average social cost C is evaluated using the performance measures above via the relation C = I + rR + hB (see §3.5):
Equilibrium
Recognizing that nondisclosure and full disclosure are obtained by setting s = 0 and s = , we see that the objective functions under the binary disclosure policy follow directly from the expressions derived above. With the objective functions for both disclosure policies speci…ed, we now characterize the equilibrium arising under periodic inspections. As a …rst step of the backward induction, we start with the …rm's optimal response to the announced values of 0 and > 0.
Lemma 2 Under periodic inspections with 0 and > 0, the …rm chooses the threshold disclosure policy with s = min
As expected, the …rm prefers the threshold disclosure policy to the binary disclosure policy because the former presents ‡exibility that the latter lacks (continuous decision variable s vs. binary decision).
Notice from the lemma that nondisclosure (s = 0) occurs if and only if = 0. That is, the …rm keeps silence if no penalty is charged for noncompliance detection, but even a small amount of penalty prompts the …rm to adopt partial disclosure (s > 0).
Next, we turn to the regulator's problem. Anticipating the …rm's choice speci…ed above, the regulator who employs periodic inspections determines and that minimize the long-run average social cost subject to the maximum penalty constraint. Let I , R , B , and be the performance measures in Corollary 1 evaluated at s . Then the regulator's problem is to minimize C I + rR + hB subject to r . For notational convenience, let
The equilibrium decisions, denoted by the superscript p, are as follows. A number of important observations are made from this proposition. First, the maximum penalty constraint binds in equilibrium, i.e., the regulator sets the penalty to the maximum allowed amount r . This agrees with the results found in the majority of papers in the law enforcement literature including and , and it is in part driven by the assumption that the regulator may levy the penalty without incurring any cost of her own. Second, in equilibrium the …rm's choice of the disclosure window size s p is independent of the inspection interval p , despite the fact that in general the …rm's optimal response s is a function of both and (see Lemma 2) .
This happens because, once the regulator uses the penalty as a lever for inducing the …rm to choose a desired size of the disclosure window, she adjusts the inspection interval to ensure that it is never exceeded by the window size (i.e., s should be maintained); otherwise inspections are performed too frequently, not taking full advantage of the …rm's disclosure. We discuss other implications of Proposition 1 in §5, where we compare the equilibria under periodic and random inspections.
Random Inspections
As described in §3.4, under the random inspection policy the regulator sets the inspection frequency = 1= but randomizes the actual inspection times by sampling from the exponential distribution to determine the inspection interval T . As the next lemma shows, the …rm responds to the regulator's announcement of the penalty and inspection frequency in a much simpler manner than he does under periodic inspections. In contrast to the periodic inspections case, the threshold disclosure policy does not o¤er an advantage over the binary disclosure policy to the …rm. In fact, the optimal threshold policy under random inspections degenerates into the optimal binary policy. Such a simple decision structure is enabled by memorylessness of the inspection interval T . Because of memorylessness, the …rm's expectation about the timing of the next inspection does not change over time. Then, due to this time symmetry, the decision on whether or not an instance of noncompliance should be disclosed applies uniformly to all occurrences of noncompliance: either all are disclosed or none is. As a result, partial disclosure never arises under random inspections.
Recall from §4.1 that we used approximate performance measures to derive the equilibrium solution under periodic inspections. To maintain consistency, we similarly approximate the measures in Lemma 3 and use them as the basis of our analysis:
Using these expressions, we can write the long-run average social cost C = I + rR + hB as
The regulator chooses and that together minimize this function subject to the maximum penalty constraint r . The equilibrium decisions, denoted by the superscript r, are as follows. Note that the quantities y and z de…ned in the proposition satisfy 0 < y < z under the assumptions < (h r) = 2 and introduced in §3. The proposition con…rms the dichotomous structure of the equilibrium under random inspections which follows directly from the …rm's binary response. In addition, it reveals a major di¤erence between the equilibria under periodic and random inspections: under the latter, the maximum penalty constraint does not necessarily bind. For small values of , the regulator may choose any penalty amount without changing the equilibrium as long as it satis…es the constraint r . This degenerate solution arises if the regulator …nds full disclosure ine¢ cient. That is, if a large penalty cannot be imposed (small ), even at the maximum allowed penalty the regulator may be unable to …nd a cost-e¤ective inspection frequency that induces full disclosure. Facing such a situation, the regulator will instead choose the inspection frequency that minimizes the social cost without inducing full disclosure. When this equilibrium is established, however, an incremental increase in penalty does not change the …rm's nondisclosure response nor the social cost. The regulator's indi¤erence toward penalty for the case < y re ‡ects this situation.
Combining (4) with the results in Proposition 2, we can obtain a closed-form expression for the optimal long-run average social cost:
Comparison of Equilibria
In this section we compare the equilibria under periodic and random inspections that we derived in the last section. In §5.1 we focus on the relationship between the two enforcement levers under each inspection policy, and in §5.2 we compare the social costs under the two policies. In the discussions below we pay special attention to how the equilibria are impacted by the maximum penalty constraint, represented by the parameter , which plays a key role in determining the e¤ectiveness of an inspection policy.
Relationship between Penalty and Inspection Frequency
We …rst examine the relationship between the two enforcement levers, penalty and inspection frequency, when their values are determined in equilibrium. As found in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, under both periodic and random inspections the penalties p and r are set to the maximum amount (r ) except when is su¢ ciently small under random inspections (see §4.2). That the maximum penalty limit is reached re ‡ects the fact that the penalty is a more e¢ cient instrument than inspections; unlike the latter, the regulator does not incur any direct cost by using the penalty as an incentive. It also implies that relaxing the binding maximum penalty constraint (larger ) leads to a new equilibrium in which the penalty is increased accordingly. Thus, p and r increase as becomes larger.
By contrast, the behaviors of p and r -or equivalently the inspection frequencies-are not Proposition 3 As increases from zero to in…nity, p initially decreases but increases after reaching a point at which = b ( ). On the other hand, r initially stays constant until it jumps downward at = y , after which it increases. Both p and r increase if and only if the …rm chooses full disclosure.
For su¢ ciently large , both p and r increase in . That is, the regulator performs less frequent inspections if she is able to charge higher penalty for a violation. This relationship is intuitive since higher penalty lessens the need to perform costly inspections-this is exactly the substitutability known in the literature. However, the proposition states that substitutability does not hold when is small.
For small , the opposite may happen: under periodic inspections, the two enforcement levers in fact act as complements, i.e., higher penalty should be accompanied by more frequent inspections rather than lessen the need for inspections. See Figure 3 (a) for an illustration of this non-monotonic behavior.
As a direct consequence, the long-run average cost of inspections ( I) also exhibits non-monotonicity;
see Figure 3 (b) that illustrates this for periodic inspections. From this …nding, we conclude that the nature of the interaction between the two levers may fundamentally change depending on how much penalty can be levied.
Substitutability may be reversed under periodic inspections because transparency of the inspection schedule allows the …rm to …ne-tune his disclosure timing. If is small, such an opportunistic behavior may result in a partial disclosure equilibrium in which the …rm does not disclose early occurrences of noncompliance. Consider the chain of events that unfolds after the penalty is increased incrementally, starting from a partial equilibrium. In order to avoid the increased penalty, the …rm responds to this change by disclosing more early noncompliance occurrences (i.e., choose a larger disclosure window), thereby preempting inspections. This leads to fewer inspections, which bene…t the regulator in the form of reduced cost of inspections. However, she does not simply absorb this saving. The regulator reinvests the saving in performing more inspections, because she can induce even more disclosure by doing so as long as full disclosure has not been reached. Hence, a reinforcement mechanism is in e¤ect:
unless the …rm fully discloses noncompliance, an increased penalty leads to a new equilibrium in which the regulator schedules more frequent inspections.
The reversal of substitutability exists under random inspections as well, even though partial disclosure equilibrium does not arise. This is evident from Figure 3 (a), which shows that r jumps to a lower number, i.e., the equilibrium inspection frequency under random inspections jumps to a higher number, as the …rm switches from nondisclosure to full disclosure in response to the increased penalty.
This is an extreme version of complementarity, pushed to the limit by the …rm's binary disclosure decision. Thus the non-monotonic relationship between the two enforcement levers is quite general.
We therefore conclude that the substitutability between penalty and inspection intensity-the accepted notion in the probabilistic law enforcement literature-is in fact a quali…ed truth. If full disclosure cannot be induced because of the limited amount of penalty that can be charged to the …rm, substitutability is replaced by complementarity.
Relative Social Costs and Choice of Inspection Policy
Next, we compare the equilibrium long-run average social costs under periodic and random inspections, denoted by C p and C r . This comparison o¤ers a useful guidance to the regulator who faces a choice between the two inspection policies. As before, we pay special attention to the maximum penalty constraint. To this end, we examine how the social costs vary with under the two inspection policies.
The following proposition focuses on the limiting cases.
Proposition 4 C p < C r for su¢ ciently small , whereas C p > C r for su¢ ciently large .
In other words, random inspections are preferred if and only if the regulator can charge a large penalty to the …rm (large ); otherwise, periodic inspections are preferred. The numerical example presented in Figure 4 (a) con…rms this …nding. As the …gure shows, the advantage of random inspections disappears as approaches zero, the limit at which a lower social cost is attained under periodic inspections than under random inspections.
Intuition suggests that performing random inspections is more e¤ective than performing periodic inspections. Consider periodic inspections. Under this policy the …rm perfectly anticipates when the next inspection arrives, and therefore he is able to …ne-tune his disclosure timing so that he discloses only the noncompliance episodes that occur close to the next inspection arrival. Such an opportunistic behavior is mitigated under the random inspection policy, since there is no certainty about the timing As it turns out, ceteris paribus, it is more e¢ cient to perform periodic inspections than to perform random inspections when the compliance/noncompliance states alternate as a Markov process. The next lemma supports this assertion.
Lemma 4
With …xed inspection frequency, the long-run average social cost is lower under periodic inspections than under random inspections if the …rm is induced to choose either nondisclosure or full disclosure under both inspection policies.
Note that the lemma is proved using the exact performance measures; the result is general and does not depend on the approximations. The assumptions in Lemma 4 are chosen to isolate the impact of randomization, the key di¤erence between the two inspection policies. As a result, unlike in Proposition 4, we do not compare the equilibrium outcomes that are in ‡uenced by other confounding factors such as the binding maximum penalty constraint. Instead, we control for these factors as follows.
First, we normalize the …rm's disclosure behavior by considering only the cases in which the …rm either fully discloses noncompliance or never does under both inspection policies. (Partial disclosure is not considered because such an outcome does not arise under random inspections.) Second, we …x the inspection frequency, which allows us to focus on the e¤ect of randomizing the inspection interval around its mean. With these factors controlled for, the lemma states that performing periodic inspections is more e¢ cient than performing random inspections.
To understand the reason for this result, consider the case where the …rm never discloses noncompliance. Then noncompliance can only be discovered via detection, and therefore the e¢ ciency of an inspection policy is determined entirely by the detection probability. This is precisely (t) given in (1), namely, the probability that an inspection at time t …nds noncompliance after compliance is observed at time zero. Under the periodic inspection policy, inspections are performed every constant time units equal to ; hence, the detection probability is ( ). On the other hand, under the random inspection policy, inspections are performed every T random time units, which has mean E [T ] = ; hence the detection probability is E [ (T )] in this case. Notice from (1) that (t) is concave increasing.
Then by Jensen's inequality we have ( ) > E [ (T )], i.e., the probability of detection is greater under periodic inspections than under random inspections. This implies that periodic inspections are more e¢ cient than random inspections at detecting noncompliance, thus lowering the overall cost.
Therefore, higher e¢ ciency is achieved with periodic inspections because the detection probability exhibits diminishing returns in time. This concavity arises from the transient behavior of the underlying Markov process, which restarts each time an inspection arrives and …nds compliance (due to memorylessness of the compliance duration). Once compliance is observed, it takes time for the ensuing state transitions to gradually settle into the steady state. Then, as the regulator delays the time of next inspection, the probability of …nding noncompliance at that time increases but with decreasing rates because the probability converges to the steady-state limit lim t!1 (t) = =( + ).
This convergence gives rise to concavity, which is signi…cant as long as inspections are performed at …nite intervals. 8 The e¤ect of concavity is as follows. Consider a regulator who ‡ips a coin to decide whether she should inspect the …rm earlier or later than the scheduled inspection time. An early detection presents an advantage of preventing more pollutions, but because the detection probability increases in time, the chance of detection is higher if the inspection is delayed. Although randomization balances this tradeo¤ between early and late inspections, it also brings e¢ ciency loss; due to the concavity in detection probability, randomization assigns more weight to an early non-detection than to a late detection. As a result, on average it leads to a lower probability of detection.
Returning to the result of Proposition 4, we now see that the conditional statement there-that random inspections are preferred if and only if is large-originates from the tension between e¢ ciency of noncompliance detection and the …rm's opportunistic disclosure behavior. Relative to random inspections, performing periodic inspections brings higher e¢ ciency of detection but at the same time allows the …rm to …ne-tune his disclosure timing, thus softening the impact of an increased penalty.
When is small, the former bene…t dominates the latter disadvantage because the impact of the …rm's muted response to the penalty is limited by the small amount charged while the relative contribution of inspections is increased. When is large, by contrast, the opposite happens because the …rm's muted response is ampli…ed by the large penalty while the relative contribution of inspections is reduced.
Because of this tradeo¤, a regulator who considers implementing a cost-e¤ective inspection policy would have to make a choice. One key determinant of such a choice is the (normalized) maximum penalty , which has been our focus so far. Another is , the cost incurred in each inspection. Both are important economic factors that directly in ‡uence the e¤ectiveness of an inspection policy. In Figure   4 (b) we identify the regions in the ( ; ) space in which either the periodic inspection policy or the random inspection policy is preferred in terms of minimizing the social cost. As the …gure illustrates, periodic inspections are preferred if the amount of penalty that can be charged to the …rm is limited and it is expensive to perform an inspection. Otherwise, random inspections are preferred. Therefore, periodic inspections are recommended to a regulator who operates in restrictive conditions (small and large ). In the next section we discuss the implications of this …nding.
Conclusions
In this paper we o¤er new perspectives on the problem of environmental regulation enforcements.
Building on the ideas and tools from the mathematical theory of reliability, we develop a novel analytical framework that brings precision to the problem features that have been abstracted in the existing literature. In particular, we add a time dimension to the decisions made by a manufacturing …rm and a regulator in a production setting, representing stochastic pollutant emissions as an alternating Markov process. We study the situations in which environmental violations occur unintentionally. We assume that the …rm follows a decision rule on when such random occurrences should be disclosed, knowing that he will be charged a penalty if noncompliance is discovered in an inspection. In turn, the regulator chooses the amount of penalty and the frequency of inspections that minimize the long-run average social cost. The regulator employs either periodic inspections performed at regular intervals or random inspections, under which the inspection interval is sampled from an exponential distribution.
We …nd that, contrary to a commonly held belief, the two enforcement levers-inspection intensity and penalty-do not necessarily act as substitutes in in ‡uencing the …rm's decision. While it is intuitive that a higher penalty alleviates the need for frequent inspections, such a relationship is valid only when the …rm is induced to fully disclose noncompliance. Full disclosure may not happen, though. If the maximum amount of penalty that can be charged to the …rm is limited, the …rm either never discloses noncompliance (under random inspections) or discloses only the late occurrences of noncompliance (under periodic inspections), taking a chance that the early occurrences will be resolved before the next scheduled inspection. With such an opportunistic behavior, substitutability may be reversed: the two enforcement levers act as complements. This means that the regulator minimizes the social cost by combining frequent inspections with a larger penalty, thus o¤ering a stick-and-stick rather than a carrot-and-stick incentive to the …rm. It also implies that the regulator's enforcement cost may rise despite the threat of increased penalty, the opposite of the known conclusion in the literature.
Furthermore, we …nd that periodic inspections may outperform random inspections even though the latter possesses a "surprise factor" that the former lacks. This is not immediately clear, because periodic inspections provide the …rm with perfect information about the inspection schedule, which the …rm uses to act opportunistically with regard to his disclosure timing. Such a behavior lowers the e¤ectiveness of periodic inspections, yet the net e¢ ciency may actually be higher than under random inspections. As it turns out, periodic inspections are more e¢ cient at detecting noncompliance when compliance/noncompliance states alternate stochastically. This happens because …nite inspection intervals capture the transient behavior of the state transitions, which introduces e¢ ciency loss when inspections are randomized. Therefore, there exists a tradeo¤ between e¢ cient noncompliance detection and exacerbating the …rm's opportunistic disclosure behavior. Depending on which is more signi…cant, either inspection policy may be preferred. We …nd that periodic inspections are preferred when the regulator operates in restrictive conditions, marked by limited penalty and high cost of inspections. If these conditions are not in place, random inspections are preferred.
Our …ndings suggest that the strategy for enforcing environmental regulations should be tailored to the characteristics of a …rm. If a signi…cant portion of environmental violations occur unintentionally due to accidents or other random causes such as equipment malfunctions, a one-size-…ts-all approach is inadequate. Against large …rms with su¢ cient …nancial means and transparent operations (e.g., multinational manufacturers), the strategy of utilizing random inspections and imposing large …nes in lieu of inspections would be e¤ective. However, according to our analysis, the same strategy would not be as e¤ective against small …rms with limited …nancial resources and nontransparent operations (e.g., local suppliers). For these …rms, the regulator should consider complementing penalties with frequent inspections, performed at regular intervals. Recognizing this di¤erence is especially important because in many cases the worst polluters are small-scale enterprises operating in less visible sectors.
As Lanjouw (2006, p. 54) notes, it is believed that "small …rms are more intensive producers of pollution than large …rms" in large part because these …rms tend to use older equipment that are more prone to breakdowns. Given the potentially large environmental impact originating these …rms, a well-executed enforcement strategy tailored to them may have a disproportionate e¤ect on overall performance of environmental regulations.
Finally, the analytical framework developed in this paper has a potential as a diagnostic tool. For example, the framework o¤ers a natural way to infer the amount of emissions that escape detection, which can be readily computed by evaluating the performance measures derived in the model. Such inferences are widespread in other areas (for example, Kaplan (2010) suggests a queuing model that predicts the number of undetected terror plots), and our model paves the way for similar applications.
Notes
1 In the literature the terms "audit" and "monitoring" are often used synonymously with "inspection," despite the di¤erences in nuance. We adopt the same convention but primarily use the last term. 2 The stochastic process of alternating compliance/noncompliance states is best understood using a machine repair analogy. Suppose that the …rm operates a pollution control system that removes toxicity from the pollutant. Because of imperfect reliability the system goes down occasionally, emitting untreated pollutant unless production is suspended. Noncompliance due to the failed system lasts until system repair is completed. In this example the constant rates of state transitions correspond to system failure rate and average speed of repair. This example operationalizes the suggestion by Malik (1993) that equipment malfunction is one the major sources of stochastic emissions. 3 The latter assumption is reasonable because disclosure will include information about the exact scope and location of a violation, directing the regulator to where it has occurred and sparing her e¤ort to …nd out the details. 4 Together with the earlier assumption this condition implies (h r)= , which states that the inspection cost is negligible compared to the net cost incurred by the society while a noncompliance episode goes unreported (the expected duration of which is equal to 1= ). 5 If we take the view that the maximum penalty is determined by the …rm's wealth, we may interpret and r as days-cash-on-hand and cash reserve, respectively. 6 For example, setting = = 10 in the given equation yields b y = 6:57 10 7 , implying that the maximum penalty that can be levied should satisfy = r < rb y= = 0:1 b y (r= ), i.e., the penalty should be smaller than 6.57 million times the revenue earned for the expected duration of compliance.
Increasing the ratio = further increases b y and hence the allowed penalty amount. Hence, the threshold disclosure policy weakly dominates the binary disclosure policy; the …rm chooses the former.
Proof of Proposition 1. For notational convenience let us suppress the argument in G( j ).
It can be proved that the equilibrium exists in the region satisfying = r , and that the …rm sets s = in equilibrium. (Proof is found in the accompanying Technical Appendix.) It then remains to …nd that minimizes the regulator's long-run average social cost (2) with s = substituted. Let C ( ) be the reduced cost function with s = . First, we show that C ( ) de…ned in the expanded region > 0 has a unique interior minimizer. Di¤erentiating C ( ) and setting it to zero yields the …rst-order condition G( ) = 1. Let us rewrite G( ) as G( ) =
3 . Moreover, the following properties hold: (i) in the limit ! 0, G( ), G 0 ( ), and G 00 ( ) approach 0, 0, and 
where ' 0 (x) 1 x 3 2(e x 1 x) x 2 (3 x). It can be proved that ' 0 (x) < 1 for x > 0. (Proof is in the Technical Appendix.) Then, evaluating G 00 0 ( ) at 0 , we get G 00
That G 00 0 ( ) < 0 at a critical point 0 implies G 0 ( ) is quasiconcave. Recall the assumptions 1 and h r > stated in §3 which together imply If b 2, it is straightforward to show that G 0 ( ) > 0 for all > 0. Therefore, in this case G( ) monotonically increases from 1 to h r 1 + a as goes from zero to 1. Since a > 0 when > 0 and h r > , the limit h r 1 + a is greater than 1; hence, G( ) crosses 1 exactly once from below and therefore the solution is unique. Now assume b < 2. In this case G( ) may not be monotonically increasing, i.e., it may peak before it converges to h r 1 + a as ! 1. Let be the solution of G 0 ( ) = 0, i.e., is a critical point of G( ). Note that G 0 ( ) = 0 can be written
(The function ' 0 (x) de…ned above is a special case of '(x) with b set to zero.) It can be proved that '(x) < 1 for x > 0.
Then the argument similar to the case of = 0 leads to the conclusion that the solution is unique.
In all three cases ( = 0, > 0 with b 2, > 0 with 0 < b < 2), we found that the equation
1 has a unique solution for which G( ) < 1 to its left and G( ) > 1 to its right.
Since the solution depends on we denote it as b ( ), which satis…es G 0 (b ( )) > 0. Thus, C ( ) de…ned in the expanded region > 0 has a unique interior minimizer b ( ), the statement we set out to prove. Restricting the region to that in which the equilibrium exists ( ), we …nally conclude that in equilibrium the regulator chooses p = max f ; b ( )g.
Proof of Lemma 3.
Recall that the time between two successive and uninterrupted inspections is T exp( ) where = 1 . Suppose that the …rm employs the threshold disclosure policy. At the moment noncompliance occurs, irrespective of when it occurs, the …rm facing random inspections expects that the next inspection will arrive time units later; due to memorylessness of T , the expectation does not change. Then the …rm discloses this occurrence if and only if s = ; if s < , regardless of the value of s, the onset of noncompliance is always outside of the disclosure window and therefore the …rm does not disclose it. Because the same logic applies to all occurrences of noncompliance, it follows that the …rm discloses either all or none depending on whether s = or s < . Hence, the threshold disclosure policy under random inspections degenerates into the binary disclosure policy. Next, we derive the conditions under which nondisclosure (ND) or full disclosure (FD) is optimal. The most convenient unit of analysis is a single compliance-noncompliance 
, where T i is the i th inspection in the cycle. Using Wald's equation, we have
1= +1= = + 1 . Now consider ND. As we noted above, the probability of detection in a cycle is
To compute I, note that I, the number of inspections performed in a cycle, satis…es
. Using Wald's equation
and collecting terms yield
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix . Let C and C + denote C de…ned in (4) for the regions r and > r , respectively. Evaluating C and C + at the boundary = r and subtracting them yield
implying that C is discontinuous at = r , jumping upwards as crosses r from left to right. Hence, C < C + in the vicinity of = r . Suppose r . From (4) we see Substituting z in the second derivative, we get
> 0, which implies that the unique critical point z is a local minimizer of C + . It can be veri…ed that lim !0 C + = 1,
= 1, and lim !1 @C + @ = 0; hence, z is the unique interior minimizer of C + in the expanded region 2 (0; 1). Whether z is also the global minimizer depends on the conditions z r and z > r . In the former case C + , de…ned in the region > r , is increasing in ; together with the facts that C is minimized at = r and that C < C + in the vicinity of = r , this implies that C is minimized at = r . In the latter case, C + is minimized at the interior point z > r while C is minimized at = r . Given that C < C + in the vicinity of = r , there are two candidates for the global minimizer: = r and = z . Evaluating C at these values, we get
z is the global minimizer if and only if C 2 < C 1 , which is equivalent to the condition < r y where
. Note that, since y < z , this condition implies < r z or z > r , which ensures the local minimum at = z . Summarizing, the global minimizer of C is found at = z if < r y while it is at = r if r y . The corresponding reduced social cost is
Notice that C for < r y is independent of whereas for r y it decreases in . Hence, as increases from zero to in…nity, C stays constant for < r y and then decreases afterwards. Next, we incorporate the maximum penalty constraint r in …nding that minimizes C . Two cases need to be considered separately: < y and y . If < y , the maximum penalty constraint implies < r y , the region in which C does not vary with . Hence, the minimum is found at any value of satisfying r . Recall from above that the optimal in this case is = z since < r y .
If y , on the other hand, the constraint r includes the region in which C decreases in .
Hence, C is minimized at the constraint boundary = r . Recall from above that the optimal in this case is = r = since = r r y . Summarizing, it is optimal for the regulator to choose 2 [0; r ] and = z if < y and to choose = r and = if y . The …rm's optimal response to this choice follows directly from Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 3.
First consider periodic inspections. Recall from Proposition 1 that p = max f ; b g, where we suppressed the argument in b ( ) for notational convenience. Suppose
, which we now show to be negative. In the proof of Proposition 1 we showed that the numerator satis…es
Next, observe that the denominator satis…es
where the …rst inequality follows from 1 e x > x 1+x , the second inequality from the assumption < b stated above, and the third from the assumptions h r > and 1 stated in §3 which together imply h r > 2. Therefore, (3) is an increasing function of , the statements in the proposition about p follow. Now consider random inspections. Proposition 2 states that r = z if < y while r = if y , where z is independent of . Hence, r does not vary in for < y while it increases in for y . From the same proposition we also see that the latter condition is su¢ cient and necessary for full disclosure. Note also that y < z . Then r jumps downward at
Proof of Proposition 4. Thus, (Lemma 3). In both cases, C = I + rR + hB = h + + I (h r)R since B + R = + . From the inequalities x x+1 < 1 e x < x, it follows that (t) de…ned in (1) satis…es + +1=t < (t) < t. 
B Performance Measures Under Periodic Inspections
In this section we derive the expectations of the performance measures X, I, R, B, and (summarized in Lemma 1) assuming that the …rm employs the threshold disclosure policy in response to the regulator's periodic inspections. In the lemmas and proofs below, U and D refer to the exponential i.i.d. random variables with means 1= and 1= representing the duration of each compliance and noncompliance episode, respectively. The Cases 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, and 2c refer to the …ve possible outcomes in an inspection cycle, as described in §4.1.1 and in Figure 2 .
B.1 Probability of Each Outcome in an Inspection Cycle
Lemma B.1 The probability of each case in an inspection cycle is as follows: (i) Pr (1a) = e s (1 ( s));
Proof. In Cases 1a and 1b the …rm is in compliance at both time zero and time s, an event that occurs with probability 1 ( s). On the other hand, in Cases 2a, 2b, and 2c the …rm is in compliance at time zero but is in noncompliance at time s, an event that occurs with probability ( s). Using the memoryless properties of these random variables, from Figure 2 we see that the probabilities for the …ve cases are: 
B.6 Firm' s Expected Cost in an Inspection Cycle
Lemma B.6 The …rm's conditional expected pro…t per inspection cycle for each case is as follows: Proof. In Case 1a and Case 2b production continues until time , when the inspection cycle ends with no disclosure or detection. Hence the expected pro…t is r . In Case 1b production continues until the …rm discloses noncompliance at its onset which then lasts D additional amount of time before the cycle ends. Therefore, production expects to last E x 4 < 0. Since '(x) starts from one at x = 0 and decreases to 1 as x ! 1, we conclude '(x) < 1 for all x > 0 if b = 0. Now suppose 0 < b 2. Observe that the numerator of '(x) is equal to 3b < 0 at x = 0. Hence, lim x!0 '(x) = 1. Applying l'Hopital's rule repeatedly, we also have lim x!1 '(x) = 1 2 b 6 lim x!1 xe x = 1. Di¤erentiating, ' 0 (x) = 1 x 4 18 + 8x + x 2 (2 b) 9 5x + x 2 e x . Therefore, ' 0 (x) = 0 is equivalent to (x) = 2 b where (x)
e x . Note (0) = 2, lim x!1 (x) = 0, and 0 (x) = x 3 (x+3)e x (x 2 5x+9) 2 < 0. Since (x) decreases from 2 to zero as x goes from zero to in…nity and 0 < b 2, there is exactly one solution to (x) = 2 b. This implies that there is exactly one x that solves ' 0 (x) = 0, i.e., exactly one critical point of '(x) exists. Given that lim x!0 '(x) = lim x!1 '(x) = 1, this critical point is a maximizer, which we denote as b
x. Evaluating '(x) at this point yields '(b x) = 2) The equilibrium exists in the region and satis…es = r . Consequently, the …rm sets s = in equilibrium.
Proof. Note that the social cost C = I + rR + hB can be written as C = h + I (h r) R using the identity B = R. Let s( ) 1 ln 1 + r . We …rst prove that the equilibrium does not exist for < . Suppose < and divide it into two regions: < s( ) and s( ) < . The upper bound s( ) is imposed by the maximum penalty constraint r . If < s( ) , according to Lemma 2 the …rm chooses s = and thus the social cost (2) reduces to C = r 2 + 1 , which is independent of but decreases in . Since C keeps decreasing in in the considered region < s( ), the minimum of C , if it exists in < , should be found in the next region s( ) < . In this region the …rm chooses s = s( ) according to Lemma 2. In Lemma C.2 we proved that I with s = s( ) decreases in while R increases in . Consequently C decreases in if s( ) < , and because s( ) increases, the minimum of C , if it exists in this region, should satisfy s( ) = where the maximum is found. But from Lemma 2 we see that s( ) = implies s = , in which case the social cost (2) again reduces to C = r 2 + 1 . Since this function decreases in for < , by the similar argument as above the minimum does not exist in < , thus con…rming the statement we set out to prove. Now assume . With the maximum penalty constraint this condition requires s( ) . Since s( ) , from Lemma 2 we see that the …rm chooses s = s( ) and that C decreases in , by the same reasoning as above. Then the minimum of C satis…es s( ) = in the considered region s( ) since C keeps decreasing as goes up until s( ), which increases, reaches its upper bound . Hence, the equilibrium exists for and it satis…es s( ) = or equivalently = r , at which s = s( ) = .
Proposition C.1 The …rm employing the threshold disclosure policy under periodic inspections strictly prefers immediate disclosure to delayed disclosure. Similarly, the …rm employing the binary disclosure policy under random inspections prefers immediate disclosure to delayed disclosure.
Proof. (a) (Threshold disclosure policy under periodic inspections) Let delayed threshold disclosure policy be the modi…ed version of the threshold disclosure policy under which the …rm discloses noncompliance after its onset. Speci…cally, this policy works as follows: for any new noncompliance episode starting within the disclosure window, the …rm discloses it either at z > 0 time units after its onset or at its conclusion, whichever happens …rst, unless it is …rst detected in the next scheduled inspection. If the inspection arrives before both of these two disclosure opportunities, then the …rm does not disclose it until being detected. We prove the proposition in three steps. First, we identify the optimal policy among many possible delayed disclosure ("DD") policies with di¤erent delay times.
under the optimal DD policy the …rm discloses noncompliance at its conclusion and pay the penalty, whereas under ND policy the …rm does not disclose it and avoids the penalty. The corresponding per-cycle pro…ts are r(u + D) and r , or equivalently the corresponding per-cycle opportunity costs are + r( u D) > 0 and zero, respectively. In addition, the corresponding cycle lengths are u + D and , respectively. Since the opportunity cost per unit time for Cases 1b and 2c is lower under ND policy than under the optimal DD policy (zero vs. positive) for any realized value of u 2 ( s; ), the long-run average cost for the …rm is also lower under ND policy. Hence, the …rm prefers ND policy to the optimal DD policy and thus to any DD policy. Note that we arrived at this conclusion under the assumption s > 0; if s = 0, then there is no distinction between the policies because disclosure never happens. Therefore, ND policy weakly dominates DD policy. Finally, we show that ND policy is dominated by the original policy. Note that ND policy is identical to the original policy with s set to zero. In other words, the …rm's long-run average cost under ND policy is exactly the same as appearing in Corollary 1 with s = 0. But we proved in Lemma 2 that with > 0 is minimized at s > 0; hence, the policy that requires s = 0 for (ND policy) is strictly dominated by the policy that does not (original policy). Then, since ND policy weakly dominates DD policy, the original policy strictly dominates DD policy.
(b) (Binary disclosure policy under random inspections) The unit of the analysis in this case is the compliance-noncompliance cycle of length U + D (see the proof of Lemma 3). Under DD, the …rm discloses noncompliance z 2 (0; D] time units after the onset, incurring the late disclosure penalty . Consider two cases: T r D and T r > D. If T r D, noncompliance is detected at time U + T r if T r z whereas it is disclosed at time U + z if T r > z. In each case the penalty is incurred and production is suspended as soon as noncompliance is reported. Hence, the conditional expected per-cycle pro…t is rE [U ] + rE [min fT r ; zg]
. If T r > D, on the other hand, no detection occurs but noncompliance is disclosed at time U + z. The corresponding conditional expected percycle pro…t is rE [U ] + rz . Combining the two cases, the …rm's expected pro…t per cycle is rE [U ] + rE [min fT r ; zg] Pr (T r D) + rz Pr (T r > D). Notice that this quantity increases in z. This implies that the …rm maximizes its expected per-cycle pro…t by delaying disclosure as much as possible, i.e., disclose a noncompliance episode at its conclusion unless it is detected. However, this policy is dominated by ND since the latter results in a saving of the penalty , which is avoided if the …rm does not disclose noncompliance at its conclusion, without a¤ecting the revenue. Therefore DD is never optimal; it is dominated by ND. Note that, if r , DD is also dominated by FD since in this case FD dominates ND, which in turn dominates DD.
